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Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to assess whether the timing of elections affects
tax policy choices. To do so, we exploit information on the German local business
tax which is set autonomously by German municipalities. As the dates for local
council elections vary across German states, the data allows us to disentangle
effects related to the timing of elections from common trends. The findings
support the notion of a political cycle in tax setting as the growth in local
business tax rates is significantly reduced in the election year and the year prior
to the election, while it significantly increases in the year after the election. This
pattern turns out to be robust against a number of sensitivity checks.
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1. Introduction
The last decades have seen a strong and rising interest in identifying the determinants of cor-
porate tax setting behavior. Recent theoretical and empirical papers stress that corporate
tax rate choices are influenced by the size and structure of the economy, the government’s
budgetary situation and tax competition (see e.g. Bucovetscy, 1991; Wilson, 1999; Buettner,
2003; Devereux, Lockwood, and Redoano, 2008). One aspect that has been rather neglected
though is the impact of political economy determinants on corporate tax rate choices. One
key question in this area is whether politicians engage in opportunistic behavior and de-
liberately manipulate government policies over the course of the electoral cycle in order to
increase their reelection prospects.
Traditional papers in this area suggest that, in a world with asymmetric information,
incumbent politicians have an incentive to signal their competency by increasing public
spending prior to elections in order to boost the economy (see e.g. Nordhaus, 1975). Empir-
ical evidence for this type of spending cycles has been rather mixed though (see e.g. Alesina,
Roubini, and Cohen (1997) and Drazen (2000) for an overview). A more recent strand of
the theoretical literature has suggested that politicians may use adjustments of short-run
policy instruments, like tax policy choices, to demonstrate their competency to the elec-
torate rather than through spending-induced changes of the economic conditions (see e.g.
Persson and Tabellini, 2001). This predicts a political business cycle in tax rates in the sense
that tax increases tend to be delayed until after the election, while the probability of tax
decreases is increased in the election year and the year prior to the election. While political
budget cycles in key budgetary elements such as spending and deficits are frequently found
in European data, empirical evidence for this type of systematic tax rate manipulation is,
however, scarce at best.
The present paper contributes to this literature and tests for political cycles in tax rate
adjustments. Our empirical analysis uses the German local business tax as a testing ground
which is set autonomously by German municipalities. The analysis is based on a unique
and rich panel data base of around 8000 German municipalities and their political, social
and budgetary situation for the time period between 2000 and 2008. As election dates vary
across local councils, the data allow us to disentangle effects related to the timing of elections
from common trends.
Descriptively, our data suggest a strong trend to increase the local business tax rate during
the covered time period. While more than half of the communities in our sample raise their
local business tax rate once or more during our sample period, only a small fraction of around
5% of the communities enacted a tax decrease. This pattern largely reflects a number of
expenditure shocks at the local level within our sample period driven by rising costs for the
provision of social services and a number of reforms that shifted public responsibilities to
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the local level. In consequence, communities were forced to adjust their local business tax
rates as the major revenue instrument at their own discretion.
The purpose of this paper is to assess the timing of these local business tax rate changes
and to test whether it follows a systematic pattern induced by the electoral cycle. To do so,
we estimate panel models which determine the effect of elections on the annual growth rate
of local business taxes. In robustness checks, we also use logistic models to determine the
impact on the probability that a municipality increases or decreases its local business tax
rate. Our results provide strong evidence in favor of an electoral cycle. Specifically, we find
that tax rate growth and the probability to observe an increase in the local business tax
rate are significantly lower in election and pre-election years, while they jump up in the post
election years. The effects are quantitatively important. Our preferred estimates suggest
that, relative to other years, the growth rate of local business tax rates is, evaluated at the
sample mean, reduced by more than 40% in election years and increased by around the
same amount in post-election years. This result is robust to controlling for a large number
of economic, social and budgetary characteristics as well as municipality fixed effects.
As indicated above, our paper relates to the empirical literature on political budget cycles.
The majority of papers in this literature focuses on spending cycles and reports rather mixed
evidence (see Alesina, Roubini, and Cohen, 1997). We are aware of only three earlier papers
that assess political cycles in tax rates. Mikesell (1978) and Nelson (2000) analyze the effect
of elections on the adjustment of US state taxes in the post-war period. While they do find
patterns which are in line with the notion of political tax cycles, their identification approach
is purely descriptive and does not account for any type of heterogeneity between US states.
Thus, their qualitative and quantitative results may suffer from problems related to omitted
variables. A recent paper by Dahlberg and Mo¨rk (2011) provides evidence for electoral
effects on tax rate changes by combining Swedish and Finish data on local governments. In
their study, variation in election dates arises only between the two groups of Swedish and
Finish municipalities which differ in their institutional characteristics and may be subject
to heterogeneous shocks. Our estimation approach tackles these problems by exploiting
variation in election timing across federal states within the same country and by controlling
for both, time-constant and time-varying heterogeneity in the social, political, and budget
situation of municipalities.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides a brief theoretical
motivation for our analysis, Section 3 presents our data set and gives a brief overview over
the institutional background for the German local business tax. Our estimation strategy is
described in Section 4. Section 5 presents the results and Section 6 concludes.
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2. Theory and related literature
One of the main elements of fiscal policy is politics. The main reasoning is, as Tufte (1978)
summarizes, that “as goes politics, so goes economic policy and performance. This is the
case because, as goes economic performance, so goes the election.” This relationship has been
studied extensively by the theoretical and empirical literature on political business cycles and
political budget cycles. The central idea of a political business cycle is that politicians have
an incentive to implement demand-increasing policy measures prior to elections in order to
boost the economy which then affects key macroeconomic variables, such as unemployment,
output, and inflation (Nordhaus, 1975; Lindbeck, 1976). The empirical evidence for such
a political cycle in macroeconomic performance is, however, rather mixed (see Alesina,
Roubini, and Cohen (1997) and Drazen (2000) for an overview). On theoretical grounds
these models were criticized for their assumption of non-rational and myopic voters, which
are easy to fool by such means.
Subsequent papers drop the irrationality assumption and focus on information asymme-
tries between voters and politicians. Rogoff and Sibert (1988) and Rogoff (1990) investigate
fiscal choices in a game where politicians signal their level of competence. As a result, fiscal
policies are distorted in election years. An important difference to the earlier papers is that
these models predict distortions in main budgetary concepts, such as spending, revenues,
deficits, and taxes rather than in macroeconomic indicators. It has been argued that politi-
cians may want to implement expansionary politics in election and pre-election periods to
signal their competency to the electorate by a higher level of public good supply at constant
levels of taxation or by implementing low-tax policies for a given public good provision. Be-
yond these signalling considerations, incumbents may want to implement political actions
in pre-election years, which in a very general sense are likely to be appreciated by the elec-
torate and which might thus increase their reelection probability. Analogously, as voters face
high costs of ousting unpopular politicians from office in non-election years and “unpopular
actions in nonelection years may be heavily discounted by election time” (Nelson, 2000, p.
544) if voters have short memories, politicians have an incentive to implement unpopular
decisions at the beginning of the election period when the time span to the next election is
as large as possible.
Following most of the empirical literature, we do not aim at providing an explicit test
of political budget cycle models. As noted by Kneebone and McKenzie (2001), doing so is
difficult since a measure for government competency is needed. Instead, we test a reduced
form of political budget cycle models by investigating whether tax rate choices are deter-
mined by election dates. There is a large and still growing literature testing for election
effects in public policy. Most of this literature finds evidence in favor of political budget
cycles across European and OECD countries. Alesina, Roubini, and Cohen (1997) provide
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an exhaustive overview. Recent work of Schuknecht (2000), Persson and Tabellini (2003a,b)
and Shi and Svensson (2006) report results which are in line with political spending cycles
at the national level.1 Hallerberg, Strauch, and von Hagen (2007) show that public debt of
European Union countries tends to increase more in election years. In particular after the
set-up of the European Monetary Union members of the Eurozone have systematically run
fiscal expansions during election years (Buti and van den Noord, 2003; von Hagen, 2006;
Mink and de Haan, 2005; Efthyvoulou, 2012). Similar evidence for an effect of elections on
debt in OECD countries is found by Alt and Dreyer Lassen (2006).2
Using data collected at the country level obviously has a number of limitations, first and
foremost that it commonly does not allow to perfectly control for all other institutional
and monetary differences across countries. In line with Rogoff’s advice to “look at data for
state and local elections, instead of concentrating solely on the small number of observations
available for national elections” (Rogoff, 1990, pp. 34), using a panel at the sub-national
level with data for several regions or local governments which operate under similar regu-
lations in one country can solve this problem. Empirical contributions using sub-national
data commonly find election effects in budgetary components. As the first empirical contri-
butions using sub-national data, Blais and Nadeau (1992) find that government spending of
Canadian provinces does increase in election years and this extra spending translates into a
high deficit, while Rosenberg (1992) finds a significant increase of spending in pre-election
years for Israeli municipalities.3 However, the advantage of institutional homogeneity and
more data points when using sub-national data comes at a cost: in most of the applications,
local election dates do not vary across observations.
The focus of our paper is on business tax rates as one of the most directly visible elements
of local public finance. Some of the earlier studies do investigate electoral effects in revenues,
in particular the share of revenues generated by taxation. However, it is not clear why these
revenue shares should be a signal of competence to voters. Lower revenues at a given tax rate
1Persson and Tabellini (2003a) moreover suggest that electoral cycles differ across political systems.
Their evidence suggests that, while pre-election tax cuts are a universal phenomenon, post-election fiscal
adjustments (spending cuts, tax hikes and rises in surplus) tend to be present in presidential democracies.
Majoritarian electoral rules are associated with pre-electoral spending cuts, while proportional electoral rules
are associated with expansions of welfare spending both before and after elections.
2This paper confirms a political budget cycle conditional on the degree of transparency of the budget
process and qualifies the results of Brender and Drazen (2005). They claim that budget cycles are only a
phenomenon of countries which recently have become a democracy. However, according to the vast majority
of studies the occurrence of political budget cycles across European countries is a well established result.
3Other studies with a focus on sub-national governments provide evidence for electoral cycles in spending
and deficits for the German state level (Galli and Rossi, 2002), for Sweden (Pettersson-Lidbom, 2001),
for regional governments in Russia (Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya, 2004), and for Colombian municipalities
(Drazen and Eslava, 2010). Veiga and Veiga (2007) and Baleiras and da Silva Costa (2004) provide evidence
for political expenditure cycles for Portuguese municipalities, as does Kneebone and McKenzie (2001) for
Canadian provinces. Dahlberg and Mo¨rk (2011) show that elections impact on public employment using
data for Sweden and Finland. The fact that these studies do find political budget cycles for well established
democracies casts further doubt on the new-democracy hypothesis of Brender and Drazen (2005).
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for instance could be seen as exactly the opposite, the government’s inability to administer
the tax collection. A notable exception is the paper of Dahlberg and Mo¨rk (2011) which
also accounts for changes in statutory tax rates.
Apart from that, the effect of electoral cycles on tax setting behavior is rather unexplored.
We are aware of only two studies which, in a descriptive way, assess the effect of elections
on the tax policy choice of US states. Mikesell (1978) and Nelson (2000) investigate how
electoral cycles impact on the changes in tax rates and the adoption of new taxes for US
states. Both papers report evidence for a strong political cycle as tax increases occur with
a higher frequency the larger the time until the next election. However, results are based
on a purely descriptive approach and do not account for cross-sectional or longitudinal
heterogeneity which may be correlated with the states’ tax policy and confound the results.
We account for these shortcomings and use a more rigorous empirical identification strat-
egy to test for political cycles in the context of the German local business tax. If the above
theoretical incentives are relevant for political decision making, local politicians in Germany
may want to signal their competency to the electorate by keeping local business taxes low,
for a given amount of public good provision. Following this line of argument, we expect
a reduced probability for tax increases prior to elections and a higher one once the elec-
tion took place. Note in this context that, beyond the competence signal, increases in the
local business tax might be unpopular with voters in a very direct sense as tax increases
likely exert an effect on the inhabitants’ after-tax income. The German local business tax
is levied on unincorporated as well as incorporated businesses and reduces their after-tax
income. Business owners are often residents and hence voters in the community and are
thus directly harmed by the tax increase. They also act as an influential multiplier, since
they can easily express their opinion over public policies to their costumers which are part
of the electorate. In addition, several studies suggest that a significant fraction of corporate
and business taxes are borne by workers (see e.g. Arulampalam, Devereux, and Maffini,
2007; Desai, Foley, and Hines, 2007), which may also make business tax increases unpopular
with the electorate. Thus, especially if voters do have short memories, this may give rise to
electoral cycles in the choice of the local business tax.
Following these considerations, we will assess the existence of electoral cycles in the tax
rate setting behavior of German municipalities. Precisely, we will investigate whether busi-
ness tax rates are significantly reduced in pre-election and election years, and significantly
increased in post-election years. In doing so, we use panel estimators and exploit that local
election dates in Germany vary across federal states. This allows us to separate common
shocks to all municipalities from potential effects related to the electoral cycle.
Note that our empirical analysis does not allow us to distinguish between the above
described theories where elections act as a device to select the most competent policymaker
(see Rogoff (1990) and also Banks and Sundaram (1998), Besley (2006)) and alternative
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mechansisms that predict electoral cycles in settings where elections curb moral hazard
behavior (see e.g. Ferejohn (1986)). While the models’ exact empirical predictions depend
on various assumptions, such as the policy process, the motivation of incumbents, and the
information set of voters, they, in a general interpretation, share a common prediction on
the pattern of the tax cycle (while they differ in their prediction on government spending,
see Pettersson-Lidbom (2003) and Persson and Tabellini (2003a)). Since we focus on the
revenue side of the budget, our analysis thus does not allow to differentiate between the
mechanisms. This is clearly an interesting road for future research which goes beyond the
aim of our paper though (see e.g. Ferraz and Finan (2011), Gagliarducci and Nannicini
(2012), Pettersson-Lidbom (2003) for first empirical steps in this direction).4
3. Data
3.1. Institutional background
The testing ground for our empirical analysis is the local government sector in Germany.
In general, the German federal system consists of three governmental tiers: the federal,
state, and local governments. There are sixteen states and around 12,000 municipalities in
Germany. The power to levy an individual tax rate on business income is restricted to the
federal and the local government level.
The responsibilities of local governments vary only slightly across German states. Their
main mandatory tasks include the construction and maintenance of roads, sewerage, kinder-
gartens and primary schools. Other responsibilities, such as the maintenance of cultural or
sport facilities, tourism, and public transport are optional. In addition, local governments
are responsible to provide certain social benefits to the unemployed and the poor. Our
sample period is characterized by rising expenditures at the local level due to increasing
social costs and a number of federal reforms which shifted additional spending burdens on
to the local government level. Examples are the law for the provision of additional kinder-
garten capacities by the local level (‘Gesetz zum Ausbau der Kindergartenbetreuung’) and
additional social security payments for the elderly and the unemployed (see e.g. Deutsche
Bundesbank, 2000, 2007).
While a major fraction of the funds for the provision of these services comes from state
grants and redistributed tax revenues, local communities have discretion over two tax in-
struments at their disposal: the local business tax (Gewerbesteuer) and a local property tax
(Grundsteuer). In revenue terms, the local business tax is by far the more important rev-
enue source for local jurisdictions and significantly contributes to local government revenues.
4Further interesting extensions include the explicit assessment of voter responses to changes in local
business rates and the analysis of responses of budgetary elements (revenues, spending and deficits) to
election dates.
7
The average tax rate set by German municipalities is 16.25% and makes up a considerable
fraction of the tax burden on firms in Germany.5 The tax base is defined as firm profit
earned within the boundaries of a municipality, town, or city. The tax applies to both - the
incorporated and non-incorporated sector. The tax base definition follows the corporate and
income tax law. While the tax base law is set at the national level and thus applies to all
municipalities in Germany, the local council of each municipality can decide autonomously
upon a so-called tax collection rate. The rate chosen is valid for at least the next entire bud-
get year. At the local level, a budget year corresponds to the calendar year. Municipalities
can change their tax rates from year to year, but not during the year. There is no upper
bound for the tax rate, but a lower bound was introduced in 2004.6 The majority of the
local business tax revenues remains directly with the municipalities. A small share has to
be transferred to the central and regional level though, as an element of the German federal
equalization scheme.
On the policy side, the election and legislative processes of local councils must be in line
with the municipal codes of their hosting states. Our empirical analysis exploits the fact that
the election dates of local councils differ across federal states. The election years for the eight
states included in our analysis are listed in Table 1. Apart from this difference, municipal
codes are similar across states. In particular, in all federal states a simple majority of votes
in the local council is required to enact a change in the local business tax rate. Moreover, in
all states, a large number of parties tend to take part in local elections, including the major
parties which also operate at the regional or national level as well as numerous local parties
and candidates.7
[Table 1 about here]
The homogeneity of the political and administrative legislation is a big advantage of our
data set. In the German sub-national context, municipal codes and law differ only slightly
across federal states (see also our discussion in Section 5). This offers convenient features to
test our hypothesis, in particular the fact that all communities have exactly the same fiscal
policy tools at hand.
5The current corporate tax rate at the national level is 15%.
6The idea was to prohibit very low tax rates chosen by a small number of ”tax haven” communities
before 2004.
7Note in this context that one important difference between elections at the local level compared to state
or federal elections is that commonly a larger number of small parties is represented in the local council as
with the former no minimum threshold of votes has to be passed in order to be considered for the allocation
of seats.
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3.2. Data set
Our data set covers German communities in the period between 2000 and 2008.8 The data
accounts for all municipalities in West German states (except the city states of Bremen
and Hamburg9). We disregard communities in Eastern Germany which joined the Federal
Republic of Germany in the reunification of 1990 as a major fraction of those communities
was subject to mergers and local government reforms after the German reunification. Fur-
thermore, we exclude West German municipalities which were subject to a merger and those
belonging to a municipal union in Lower Saxony. Eventually, we end up with a sample of
7738 municipalities.10 Figure 1 shows a graphical representation of our sample.
[Figure 1 about here]
As mentioned above, we observe a rising trend in local business tax rates during our sample
period. A majority of communities raised their local business tax rate at least once over
the 9-year-period covered by our data. Only a small number of municipalities observes two
or more increases, see Figure 2 for details. In contrast to the large number of tax hikes,
declines of local business tax rates are rare. Only around 5% of the municipalities in our
data lowered their tax rates at least once within our sample period.
[Figure 2 about here]
This pattern may on the one hand reflect increased funding needs of local municipalities
as rising social costs and reforms which shifted additional obligations to the local level put
pressure on community finances. On the other hand, our sample period is also characterized
by two major declines in the federal corporate tax rate (in 2001 and 2008) which might -
in a vertical tax competition framework - increase the communities’ incentive to raise their
local business tax rate. Figure 4 depicts the geographical distribution of tax rate changes,
showing that tax hikes and cuts are not exclusive to particular federal states.11
[Figure 4 about here]
Moreover, we augment our data set by detailed information on socio-economic and political
characteristics of the communities in our data. Descriptive statistics are presented in Table
8Some data, like electoral results, are also collected for years prior to our sample period in order to
determine whether our first sample year (the year 2000) is a post-election year and to determine the com-
position of the local council in the first sample years. The main reason for restricting the analysis to the
years 2000 to 2008 is that during this period the local business tax code which is common to all German
municpalities remained unchanged, while it was adjusted before and after that period. Moreover, some of
the community information used in this analysis is not available in concise format for earlier years.
9We exclude the city states, because local and regional budgets are not easy to separate in this context.
10Public finance data is not available for some years in the federal state of Schleswig-Holstein.
11Note, however, that the increasing trend in German local business tax rates is not unique to our sample
period. In the contrary, an increasing trend in the average local business tax rate has been observed since
the late 1970ies and early 1980ies already, see e.g. Buettner (1999).
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2. First, we include the total number of inhabitants to capture differences in community
size. The variable points to a strong heterogeneity between the municipalities in our data
which includes small jurisdictions with less than 10 inhabitants as well as the city of Munich
with 1.3 million people. Second, we include a number of socio-economic variables, precisely
the share of young inhabitants below the age of 15 and the share of old inhabitants above
the age of 65 as the demographic structure may affect local business tax choices. Third, to
capture employment effects, we include the local unemployment rate, defined as the number
of unemployed as a share of total population.12
[Table 2 about here]
Furthermore, we add three indicators for the municipalities’ fiscal performance and economic
capacity to our data set. First, we include public borrowing in each year, defined as the
share of revenues that is generated by new credits, less amortization of debts. Second, we
include the total outstanding debt in per capita terms. This value is obtained at the county
level, but it also includes municipality-specific information on debt of hospitals and other
city owned companies like transportation or sewage. Third, to control for the prosperity of
a community in terms of per capita income and wealth, we also include a variable for the
average private per capita income level. Last, we control for mandatory provision of services
by including expenditures. All described variables show a considerable cross-sectional and
longitudinal variation as indicated by large standard deviations.
Finally, we include detailed information on the seat shares of the political parties in
the municipal council. We directly observe the share of the four main parties, which
also run for national or regional elections. These are the center-right conservative party
(CDU/CSU13), the center-left social democrats (SPD), the liberal party (FDP), and the
Green party (Gruene). We create an aggregated value for all remaining political parties
which mainly are locally operating civil parties.14
12Due to confidentiality reasons, this variable is censored if less than three people are unemployed. In
this case the variable is set equal to zero.
13In the state of Bavaria the conservatives are not represented by the Christian Democratic Union (CDU)
but by their sister party, the Christian Social Union (CSU). The CDU and the CSU do not compete against
each other; they form one faction in the federal parliament.
14We also reran our estimation models additionally including indicator variables for parties at the far-left
of the political spectrum (comprising Die Linke, the former PDS, and the former WASG) and for parties
at the far-right of the political spectrum (comprising the nationally organized extreme right parties NPD,
DVU, Die Republikaner, and some right wing parties which are only regionally active) which leaves our
results unaffected, see an earlier working paper version (Foremny and Riedel (2012)). As the seat shares of
these parties are negligible and, in general, information on the seat share of smaller parties is not reported
by the state statistical offices for all elections in all German states in concise format, we subsume all smaller
parties into one category for our baseline specifications.
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4. Identification
Our baseline analysis focuses on tax rate changes in the form of the annual percentage
change of the tax rate:
τ growthi,t =
taxi,t − taxi,t−1
taxi,t−1
(1)
Alternative specifications use binary dependent variables τ binary and τ binary to assess the
determinants of the general probability that a community increases and decreases its tax
rate. The variable τ is coded one if the statutory tax rate increased from the previous to
the current year, and zero otherwise. Formally,
τ binaryi,t =
 1 if taxi,t − taxi,t−1 > 00 otherwise (2)
τ binary is defined analogously for tax decreases. The generic model estimated for the various
definitions of τ is specified as
τi,t,s = t′t,sδ + x′i,tβ + εt + µi,s + i,t (3)
where the vector t is a set of time period specific dummies, which we relate to election dates
to test for an electoral cycle. In our main analysis, we include dummy variables for the year
before an election is held, the election year, and the year after the election.
t′ =

tt−1
tt
tt+1
 and

=1 in the pre-election year, 0 otherwise
=1 in the election year, 0 otherwise
=1 in the post-election year, 0 otherwise
(4)
These variables vary across federal states s. Individual municipalities i within the borders
of one state share common election dates, but variation arisis across the German states.
In addition, the estimations include a full set of year fixed effects ε to capture common
shocks over time affecting all our sample communities. As election dates vary across commu-
nities in different states, election effects captured by the vector t and the time fixed effects
are both identified. Thus, the approach resembles a ’difference-in-differences’ framework in
which communities with no election in a particular year act as a control group to identify
the effect of elections on the tax setting behavior in the treatment group of communities
with an election (and on those communities in a pre- and post-election year respectively).15
15Note that our analysis exploits information on a large number of elections (20 elections in total, two to
three per state).
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We include community fixed effects µi in the baseline model which absorb time-constant
heterogeneity between jurisdictions and nest a full set of state fixed effects thus accounting
for potential effects related to institutional differences between states. In terms of control
variables, x is a vector of other potential socio-economic and political determinants that are
related to the decision whether or not to change the tax rate and which vary across munic-
ipalities i and over time t (see the previous section for details on the variable definition).
The baseline model is estimated with usual panel data estimators. To estimate the models
where our dependent variable comes in a binary form, we use a logit transformation and
report the average marginal effects. Due to the nature of our data, serial correlation of
errors is not a major problem. We present standard errors which are adjusted for clustering
at the state-year level to capture potential correlation of residuals at these units. Note that
clustering at the state level is infeasible since the number of groups is small. Nevertheless,
Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004) show that standard errors might be underesti-
mated in the presence of serial correlation when clustering is conducted at the state-year
rather than state level. Therefore, we, in robustness checks, also make use of two-way
clustering at the state-year and individual level (Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller, 2011).
5. Results
5.1. Baseline model
Table 3 presents the result of the estimation model outlined in equation (1). We regress
the annual growth rate of the local business tax on the set of dummy variables for the
pre-election, election and post-election year as well as a full set of community fixed effects
and time-varying community characteristics.16 Model (a) assumes independence of the errors
across observations. In models (b) and (c) standard errors are adjusted to allow for clustering
at the community level (model (b)) and state-year level (model (c)) respectively. Model (d)
accounts for two-way clustering of the errors at the state-year level and community level as
described above. Additional to coefficient estimates and standard errors, the table reports
the p-values and 95% confidence intervals for the coefficient estimates.
[Table 3 about here]
The specifications confirm the hypothesis of an electoral cycle in tax setting behavior. Specif-
ically, the coefficient estimates for the dummy variables tt−1 and tt have a negative sign, while
the coefficient estimate for the post-election year is positive. In specifications (a) and (b)
all three coefficient estimates turn out statistically significant, indicating that the growth
rate in the business tax is reduced by 0.07 in the year prior to the election and by 0.17 in
16The table depicts the coefficient estimates for the electoral dummies only. The coefficient estimates for
the control variables are reported in Table 10 in the appendix.
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the election year. Evaluated at the sample mean (=0.37, cf. Table 2), this corresponds to
a drop in the growth rate by 19% and 46% respectively. In the post election year, the esti-
mation suggests that the growth rate is significantly increased by 0.20, or evaluated at the
sample mean, by 54%. Models (c) and (d) equally derive a significant election year and post
election year effect, while the coefficient estimate for the pre-election year loses its statistical
significance. Taken together, this pattern is consistent with the theoretical considerations
in Section 2 and suggests that politicians indeed tend to keep local business taxes low by
avoiding changes prior to elections and implement tax increases in post-election years when
the time gap to the next election is maximized.17
[Table 4 about here]
As described in Section 3.1, our sample period was characterized by a strong upward trend in
local business taxes. While every second community increased its local business tax rate at
least once during our sample period, only a minor fraction of communities opted for a tax rate
reduction. To assess whether the impact of election dates on tax rate increases differs from its
impact on tax rate decreases, we transform our dependent variable to capture positive growth
rates (τ growth) and negative growth rates (τ growth) separately. Thus, in the construction of
τ growth (τ growth), community-year observations with negative (positive) tax rate growth are
treated as zero. Specifications (a) to (b) of Table 4 reestimate our baseline model accounting
for the modified dependent variables. Standard errors are adjusted to allow for clustering at
the state-year level and the specifications include a full set of community fixed effects. We
find the baseline results confirmed in specification (a) that investigates the impact of the
electoral cycle on positive growth rates in the local business tax measure. Thus, increases in
local business tax rates tend to be significantly reduced in the election year and significantly
increased in the post election year. Repeating the same exercise for the negative business
tax growth τ growth yields statistically insignificant coefficient estimates for all three election
dummies. As the number of business tax reductions observed in our data is tiny (less than
1% of the community-year observations), this likely reflects imprecisions in the estimated
effects due to limited variation in the data.
The fact that many communities do not observe a tax rate change within our sample
period further suggests that a binary regression model may fit the data better. Thus, we
additionally run estimation models that test for a potential impact of the election cycle on
17Replacing the full set of community fixed effects by a full set of state fixed effects yields comparable
results, see a previous working paper version Foremny and Riedel (2012). The coefficient estimates for the
control variables are reported in Table 10 in the appendix. Interestingly, the coefficient estimate for the
community’s newly issued debt relative to revenues (’credits’) is positive and statistically significant in all
specifications, indicating that those communities with high financing needs, as proxied by new debt issues,
tend to observe higher tax rate growth than other jurisdictions. The coefficient estimates for all other
control variables turn out insignificant. However, if we include state fixed effects only (see Foremny and
Riedel (2012) for results), we find a strong positive relationship between population size and tax growth
rates which can be also found if we consider tax hikes only (c.f. model a) of Table 4).
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the community’s probability to increase or lower the local business tax rate. Specifications
(c) and (d) of Table 4 presents the results for the marginal effects of a logit model including
state level and year fixed effects.18 Model (c) assesses the effect of the election cycle on a
community’s probability to increase its tax rate while model (d) assesses the effect on the
probability for a tax decrease. In line with the previous results, our findings are confirmed
in the specification for tax hikes while the coefficient estimates for all election dummies turn
out insignificant in most instances for the tax cuts. Again, we consider the latter finding to
reflect the too low number of community-year observations with a tax decrease. The findings
of model (c) also quantitatively correspond to our baseline estimates. Calculating marginal
effects suggests that the probability to observe a tax increase is reduced by 3.0 percentage
points in the election year and jumps up by 4.6 percentage points in the post election year.
Relative to the unconditional probability for a tax increase/decrease, this corresponds to a
change by 37% and 47%.
5.2. Robustness checks
In a first robustness check, we assess whether the election cycle is related to changes in the
composition of the local council. In general, German local politics are characterized by a
relatively large number of parties as membership in the local council is not tied to obtaining
at least 5% of the votes like it is the case in national and regional elections. Thus, besides the
nationally and regionally operating parties, a number of civil parties are active at the local
level which are mainly concerned with local policy issues and are thus difficult to classify
in the left-right-spectrum. To nevertheless assess whether changes in the distribution of
seats across parties impacts on the political business cycle determined in this paper, we
construct a measure for changes in the ideological composition of the local council in terms
of shifts in the majority for the dominant right-wing and left-wing parties. The right-wing
bloc is thereby defined to comprise the center-right conservative party (CDU/CSU) and the
liberal party (FDP), the left-wing bloc is defined to comprise the center-left social democrats
(SPD) and the Green party (Gruene).19 From this information, we define a dummy variable
indicating ideological changes in the composition of the council. The variable takes on
the value 1 if an election destroys or brings about a majority for one of the blocs. Since
smaller civil parties tend to receive a significant fraction of vote shares at the local level,
direct changes from a left-wing to a right-wing majority or vice versa are rather rare events
though.
18The coefficient estimates are presented in Table 11 in the appendix. We also estimated conditional logit
models which account for unobserved heterogeneity across jurisdictions but suffer from the shortcoming that
there are no convenient possibilities to compute marginal effects. The qualitative results of the conditional
logit model are in line with those of the logit model including only state dummies though.
19Note that the classification in left- and right-wing parties is in line with previous papers for Germany
(see e.g. Fuess and Bechtel (2008), Potrafke (2011), Furdas and Kis-Katos (2010)).
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Moreover, many observers believe that party ideology has not played a substantial role in
German public policy over the recent decades. While the empirical evidence is more mixed
(see e.g, De Haan and Zelhorst (1993), Berger and Woitek (1997), Seitz (2000), Berger
and Holler (2007), Schneider (2010), Potrafke (2011), Rodden (2001))20, it might thus be
desirable to create a measure for the change in the general composition of local council
members (irrespective of party ideology) as new members may bring in new ideas and may
thus increase the propensity for tax policy changes. Since our data does not allow us to
identify individual members of the local council, we construct an index for the change in the
seat share of different parties. Under the assumption that delegates do not switch between
parties, the index is expected to proxy for changes in the composition of council members.
Formally, the index for community i in year t reads: Ii,t = 1/2 ·∑p |si,p,t,e − si,p,t,e−1|, where
si,p,t,e and si,p,t,e−1 indicate the seat shares of party p in the local council of community i
at time t in election e and e − 1 respectively and larger index values correspond to more
pronounced changes in council composition (0 ≤ Ii,t ≤ 1). The index construction accounts
for the seat share of the four major parties (CDU/CSU, SPD, FDP and Green Party) and
the aggregate of all other parties.21
[Table 5 about here]
Table 5 reports the results of specifications which reestimate our baseline model augment-
ing the set of regressors by interaction terms between the election cycle dummies and the
variables indicating changes in the composition of the local council. As a change in council
composition may first and foremost affect policy choices in the post-election year, specifi-
cations (a) and (b) reestimate specification (c) of Table 3 including an interaction between
the post-election dummy tt+1 and measures for changes in council composition. In specifi-
cation (a) council change is defined as a change in the ideological composition of the local
council (indicating whether left-wing or right-wing majorities are destroyed or created), in
specification (b) council change is measured by changes in the general composition of the
local council as defined by index Ii,t. Both specifications confirm our baseline findings in the
sense that the local business tax growth rate is dampened in the election year and increased
in the post election year. The coefficient estimate for the interaction term turns out positive
in both specifications albeit not statistically significant. Changes in the composition of the
local council thus do not appear to exert an effect on business tax rate choices induced
by election dates. Specifications (c) and (d) reestimate the two specifications additionally
accounting for anticipation effects by also interacting the council change dummies with the
indicator variables for the election year and pre-election year respectively. All interaction
terms turn out statistically insignificant in both specifications, while the baseline electoral
cycle prevails.
20Existing empirical evidence is largely restricted to the federal and state level.
21Note that accounting for the seat share of smaller parties separately yields similar results.
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[Table 6 about here]
Furthermore, we assess the robustness of our results to including a control variable for the
lagged level of the local business tax rate. The results are presented in Table 6. Specification
(a) reestimates our baseline model using the growth rate in the business tax as dependent
variable. The coefficient estimate for the lagged level of the business tax rate turns out
negative and statistically significant indicating mean reversal in the communties’ business
tax setting behavior. Moreover, again, the coefficient estimates for the election year and post
election year dummy turn out negative and positive respectively, whereas only the former
is statistically significant at conventional significance levels though. Specifications (b) and
(c) augment the binary models by the lagged level of the dependent variable. Specification
(b) presents the results for the election cycle on a community’s probability to increase its
tax rate. In line with intuition, the coefficient estimate for the lagged dependent variable
turns out negative suggesting that communities with a high local business tax are less likely
to observe a tax increase. The specification also confirms our baseline findings qualitatively
and quantitatively whereas both, the coefficient estimates for the election and post-election
dummies now turn out statistically significant. The average marginal effect in the election
year (post-election year) is -3.0 (4.6) percentage points and thus comparable to the previous
findings. Specification (c) reports analogous results for the binary model indicating tax rate
decreases. Here, in line with intuition, the lagged dependent variable turns out positive
and statistically significant, indicating that communities with a high local business tax have
a higher probability to observe tax decreases. Apart from that the results resemble our
baseline findings.
[Table 7 about here]
In our baseline model, the growth rate of the dependent variable is calculated based on the
community’s statutory local business tax rate. A particular feature of the German local
business tax, however, is that a firm’s local business tax payment is itself deductible from
its tax base (’self-deductibility’), implying that the firm’s effective tax burden falls short
from the statutory one.22 As a robustness check, we thus reestimate our baseline model
using the growth rate in the effective local business tax as dependent variable. The results
are presented in specification (a) of Table 7 and qualitatively and quantitatively resemble
our baseline findings. As an additional modification, specification (b) reruns the baseline
estimation using the change in the local business tax rate as the dependent variable instead
of the growth rate. Again, the findings are comparable to our baseline estimates.
[Table 8 about here]
22Self-deductibility of the local business tax implies that the corporate tax payment T is calculated as
T = t(pi−T ), with t denoting the local business tax rate (in percentage values) and pi denoting the company
profits. Rearranging yields T = t/(1+t)pi. Hence, the statutory local business tax rate which is, for example,
implied by a local business tax of 16.25% is 0.1625/1.1625=14%.
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Our baseline model includes three dummy variables to capture the electoral cycle: a dummy
variable for the pre-election year, a dummy variable for the election year and a dummy
variable for the post-election year. As elections for local councils take place every five years
(every 6 years in Bavaria), the two remaining years act as baseline category. In Table 8
we reestimate our baseline model using the local business tax growth rate as the dependent
variable and including indicator variables for the election year, for the first year after the
election, for the second year after the election, for the first year prior to the election and
for the second year prior to the election separately. The pattern is very consistent with
our theoretical considerations in the sense that we find a small and insignificant coefficient
estimate in specification (a) which includes a dummy variable for two years prior to the
election. In specification (b) we include a dummy variable for the pre-election year and find
a negative effect which is quantitatively relevant, although still not statistically significant.
In specification (c), which includes a dummy variable for the election year, the effect is
negative and larger in absolute terms than in the previous specification and now also gains
statistical significance. Including only a dummy variable for the first year after the election
yields a positive and statistically significant coefficient estimate, confirming our baseline
estimations (see specification (d)). Rerunning the specification with a dummy variable
indicating the second post-election year again yields a positive coefficient estimate which,
in line with expectation, is smaller though and does not gain statistical significance.
[Table 9 about here]
Furthermore note that our data suggests that local business tax rate choices tend to be
correlated at the state level (see Figure 4).23 This heterogeneity may stem from differences
in (the evolution of) the political, economic or social situation across states which might
induce differences in revenue needs at the local level and hence may imply a correlation in the
propensity of communities within the same state to increase or decrease their local business
tax rate. As an example, localities in Germany are partly financed through state-level grants.
Since state governments have some discretion on the generosity of these grants, state-level
financing may have become systematically less generous in some states, putting an upward
pressure on local business tax choices for all communities within that state relative to other
states. The general propensity for communities within one state to increase or decrease their
local business tax rate relative to communities in other states is absorbed in our empirical
estimation models through the inclusion of a full set of community fixed effects which nest
state fixed effects.
We are thus confident that the cyclical pattern in local business tax rate choices identified
in our paper is not confounded by differences in the general propensity of communities in
23Precisely, Figure 4 indicates that state boundaries matter for the average local business tax choice.
At the border between Baden-Wurttemberg and Bavaria, municipalities on the Bavarian side for example
appear to be much less likely to raise their local business tax within our sample period than communities
on the side of Baden-Wurttemberg.
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some states to increase/decrease their local business tax rates relative to others. Such a pat-
tern could arise only if unobserved changes in the political, economic or social conditions hit
states in systematic ways in the sense that tax-increasing state-level shocks systematically
occur in post-election years while tax-decreasing state-level shocks systematically occur in
pre-election years. This appears unlikely to us, especially given that our pre-, post- and
election year dummies reflect information on 20 elections within our sample period (two to
three per state). One may still have concerns though that our results are confounded by a
small number of exceptional state level shocks. One of our sample states may for example,
by coincidence, have been hit by a shock in a post-election year which may have induced
its communities to simultaneously raise their local business tax rate. Analogously, another
sample state might, by coincidence, have been hit by a reverse shock in a pre-election year
which may have induced its communities to simultaneously lower their local business tax
rate. To assess this possibility, we implement a jackknife analysis for our baseline model
(specification (c) of Table 3). The results are reported in Table 9, where specification (a)
excludes communities in the state of Schleswig-Holstein, specification (b) excludes commu-
nities in the state of Lower Saxony, specification (c) excludes communities in the state of
Northrhine-Westphalia, specification (d) excludes communities in the state of Hesse, spec-
ification (e) excludes communities in the state of Rhineland-Palatinate, specification (f)
excludes communities in the state of Baden-Wuerttemberg, specification (g) excludes com-
munities in the state of Bavaria and specification (h) excludes communities in the state of
Saarland. The general pattern of our results prevails in all specifications which supports the
interpretation of our findings as evidence for electoral cycles in local business tax choices.
Note that the extent and strength of positive and negative external shocks on the local
business tax choice of communities in our sample states may impact on our quantitative
findings though. Precisely, a political business cycle in local business tax choices may show
up through ’active’ or ’passive’ tax-setting responses to election dates. ’Active’ responses
to election dates imply that policy makers reduce local business tax choices in pre-election
years and increase local business tax choices in post-election years. ’Passive’ responses would
in turn imply a reaction to an external shock on the local business tax rate. A community
which in response to an external shock may want to lower or increase its local business
tax rate may manipulate the timing of the business tax change according to election dates.
While ’active’ response patterns are expected to show up irrespective of the presence of
external shocks to the local business tax rate, ’passive’ responses are expected to show up
more clearly the larger the external shocks faced by the localities. In the presence of ’passive’
response behavior and heterogeneity in the local business tax shocks across states, excluding
different (combinations of) states from our sample, may impact on the quantitative results.
In line with these considerations, there is some variation in the quantitative strength of the
local business tax cycle in the jackknife analysis. Most importantly, the qualitative pattern
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prevails in all specifications though.24
Furthermore note that our analysis has so far focussed on tax setting responses to dates
for local council elections as it is the local council which eventually decides on local business
tax changes in all our sample communities. As described above, the institutional context
is in general highly similar across German states.25 Most of our sample states followed the
same constitutional form during our sample period (’Su¨ddeutsche Ratsverfassung’). The
only exception is the state of Hesse which is still operating under a different type of the
local code (’unechte Magistratsverfassung’).26 The difference in the constitutional forms
concern the position of the mayor and the relationship between the mayor and the local
council. But in all states the local business tax for the upcoming fiscal year is determined
in the budget-bye law for the upcoming fiscal year which has to be deliberated and adopted
by a majority vote of the local council. We thus do not presume institutional differences to
affect the predictions for the political business cycle in tax setting behavior. As shown in
specification (d) of Table 9, excluding communities in the state of Hesse from our sample
moreover does not affect our results.
We cannot fully exclude though that the political business cycle identified in our paper
partly reflects responses to mayoral rather than local council elections as the mayor has
some role in preparing and drafting the budget-bye law. As described above, eventually it
is the local council though which decides on the budget-bye law and hence on changes in
the local business tax. We nevertheless collected information on election dates for mayoral
elections in our sample states (apart from Schleswig-Holstein and some municipalities in
Baden-Wuerttemberg27 and Lower Saxony where the according information is not provided
by the state statistical offices). While election years for mayoral elections and elections of the
local council are not perfectly aligned (mayoral election dates vary across communities), they
are highly correlated in our data. The correlation coefficient is a large 0.61 and may make
a separate identification of potential political business cycles related to council and mayoral
elections difficult due to multicollinearity. We nevertheless re-estimated our baseline model
augmented by three additional dummies capturing the electoral cycle for mayoral elections.
While the mayoral cycle never gains statistical significance, the results for the council cycle
24Furthermore note that the fact that we do not find a political business cycle for tax reductions may
point to the importance of ’passive’ responses in our data relative to ’active’ responses.
25We collected and compared the respective parts of the municipal codes from all federal states included
in our sample. The (translated) paragraphs of the law are available from the authors’ webpage.
26Note that after World War II, constitutional forms differed substantially across German states reflect-
ing the influence of the different occupying countries (’Rheinische Bu¨rgermeisterverfassung’ in Rhineland-
Palatine and Saarland, ’Magistratsverfassung’ in Hesse and Schleswig-Holstein, ’Norddeutsche Ratsver-
fassung’ in North Rhine-Westphalia and Lower Saxony and ’Su¨ddeutsche Ratsverfassung’ in Bavaria and
Baden-Wurttemberg). The constitutional forms were aligned in later decades. Since the 1990ies, and thus
also during our sample period, the ’Su¨ddeutsche Ratsverfassung’ has been the dominant constitutional form
for communities in Germany.
27We are grateful to Mustafa Yeter and Marc-Daniel Moessinger from the ZEW for sharing data on the
election dates of mayors in this state.
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remain largely unchanged. Precisely, the post election coefficient (tt+1) is significant and .22
of magnitude (s.e. .1) while the election year coefficient (tt) is determined with -.12 (s.e. .08)
and just fails to gain statistical significance at the 10%-significance level.28 We thus presume
our results to largely reflect responses in tax setting behavior to council elections. In any
case, the interpretation of our results does not change irrespective of whether the cycle
identified in the paper is driven by council or mayoral elections, as both cases imply that
policy makers’ decisions on local business tax rates are affected by the timing of elections.
To conclude, the results in this section are in line with an election cycle in tax rate setting.
In particular, we find that tax rate growth is significantly reduced in the election year and
significantly increased in the first post-election year.
6. Conclusion
The aim of this paper was to assess whether there is an electoral cycle in the tax setting
behavior of local communities. For that purpose, we exploited rich panel information on a
large set of communities in Germany. As the election dates for local councils in Germany
vary across states, our data allows us to disentangle effects related to electoral cycles from
common trends. Using conventional fixed effects panel methods and logit estimations, and
controlling for time-constant and time-varying heterogeneity between the communities, our
results provide strong evidence that tax setting is affected by election dates. Specifically,
our findings suggest that the tax rate growth is significantly reduced in election years, while
it jumps up in the post-election years. The effects turn out quantitatively important and
suggest that, evaluated at the sample mean, tax rate growth is decreased and increased by
more than 40% in the pre- and post-election year respectively. Thus, our findings suggest
that political economy determinants, in particular the timing of elections, affect the tax
policies of local communities. This underpins the validity of recent theoretical claims which
suggest the importance of an electoral cycle in the choice of policy instruments. In the
policy arena, the findings may have implications for the design of political systems and the
timing, synchronization and length of political election terms.
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Graphs and tables
Notes: All municipalities shaded in light gray are included in our sample. All areas in Lower Saxony shaded
in dark gray belong to joint municipalities and are dropped from the sample. Municipalities shaded in black
were subject to mergers during our sample period and are also dropped from the sample.
Figure 1: Sample
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Notes: Left (right) panel depicts the number of municipalities which experience a particular number of tax
decreases (increases) within our sample period. Note that no municipality decreased (increased) its tax rate
more than four (six) times.
Figure 2: Tax changes
0
1 0
2 0
3 0
4 0
5 0
P e
r c
e n
t
-100 -50 0 50 100
Percentage Change Tax Rate
Notes: Variable distribution for the growth rate of the local business tax in our sample.
Figure 3: Tax rate growth
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federal state years
Schleswig-Holstein 1998 2003 2008
Lower Saxony (Niedersachsen) 1996 2001 2006
North Rhine-Westphalia (Nordrhein-Westfalen) 1999 2004 2009
Hesse (Hessen) 1996 2001 2006
Rhineland-Palatinate (Rheinland-Pfalz) 1999 2004 2009
Baden-Wuerttemberg 1999 2004 2009
Bavaria (Bayern) 1996 2002 2008
Saarland 1999 2004 2009
Notes: Election years for local council elections in our sample states.
Table 1: Elections at the local level
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Variable Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
Controls
credits -.003 .092 -2.828 2.467
unemployment .029 .013 0.000 .190
young .163 .033 0.000 .600
old .180 .042 0.000 .500
city .183 .387 0.000 1.000
debt 2.368 1.034 .481 6.831
population (standardized) -0.02 1.000 -.250 41.502
income (logs) 9.763 .102 9.490 10.307
expenditures .998 6.215 -57.803 1053.085
Party controls - seat shares
cdu .246 .234 0.000 1.000
spd .163 .180 0.000 1.000
gruene .014 .035 0.000 .375
fdp .011 .033 0.000 .583
Tax data
collection rate 335.658 31.898 0 900
diff. collection rate 1.300 6.571 -150 200
Dependent variables
τ binary .007 .084 0.000 1.000
τ binary .081 .273 0.000 1.000
τ growth .369 1.974 -61.224 100
Changes (Dep.var excluding zeros)
τ growth if 6= 0 4.177 5.312 -61.225 100
N=69642, T=9 (2000-2008), n=7738
Notes: Definition of variables: credits: new credits minus repayments as share of annual revenues (missing
public finance data for the federal state of Schleswig-Holstein for the years 2000 to 2002 required linear
imputation), unemployment: unemployed people as share of total population (data is censored if less than
three people are unemployed; the ratio is set to zero in that case), population: number of inhabitants
(standardized), young: share of inhabitants aged 15 or younger, old: share of inhabitants aged 65 or older
(population data for the year 2000 is missing and imputed through the group mean) city: dummy variable,
debt: total municipal debt per capita (county level), income: income in Euro per capita (county level),
expenditures: per capita expenditures on exogenous payments; party controls are the respective seat shares
in the local council; collection rate: statutory business tax collection rate (including information for the year
1999 for the summary statistics).
Table 2: Summary statistics
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Dependent Variable Individual Fixed Effect Model
τ growth (a) (b) (c) (d)
tt−1 -0.074
s.e. (0.022) (0.023) (0.100) (0.100)
p-value 0.001 0.001 0.464 0.460
95% CI [-0.117 - -0.030] [-0.118 - -0.029] [-0.273 - 0.126] [-0.269 - 0.122]
tt -0.170
s.e. (0.025) (0.027) (0.077) (0.077)
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.031 0.028
95% CI [-0.219 - -0.121] [-0.222 - -0.118] [-0.324 - -0.016] [-0.321 - -0.018]
tt+1 0.206
s.e. (0.024) (0.026) (0.098) (0.097)
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.039 0.034
95% CI [0.159 - 0.253] [0.155 - 0.257] [0.011 - 0.401] [0.015 - 0.397]
Time FE yes yes yes yes
Clustering no community state-year two-way
Notes: Dependent variable: annual percentage change in the statutory business tax rate. Coefficients for
the pre-election, election, and post-election year are reported. Coefficients on other controls are presented in
Table 10 in the appendix A. To assure that the matrix of orthogonality conditions is of full rank, exogenous
regressors are partialed out in model (d). All models include individual fixed effects at the municipal level.
Standard errors are clustered at the reported level. p-values in bold indicate that coefficients are significant
at the 5% level.
Table 3: Baseline results
Dependent Variable τ growth τ growth τ binary τ binary
(a) (b) (c) (d)
tt−1 -0.082 0.008 -0.006 -0.003*
(0.098) (0.017) (0.017) (0.002)
tt -0.157** -0.013 -0.030** -0.002
(0.075) (0.012) (0.012) (0.002)
tt+1 0.218** -0.012 0.046** 0.001
(0.096) (0.012) (0.021) (0.002)
Notes: Dependent variable: positive (negative) annual percentage change in the statutory tax rate in models
(a) and (b); binary variables indicating tax hikes and tax cuts in models (c) and (d). Individual (municipal)
fixed effects included in models (a) and (b); state fixed effects in models (c) and (d). Time fixed effects
included in all models. Standard errors are clustered at the state-year level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Coefficients on other controls are depicted in Table 11 in the appendix. Columns (c) and (d) present the
marginal effects of the binary specification for tax hikes and tax cuts respectively. Underlying regressions
are presented in Table 11.
Table 4: Additional results
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Figure 4: Number of changes (decreases/increases)
Notes: Left (right) panel graphically illustrates the number of tax cuts (hikes) experienced by our sample
communities. Blank areas are not included in the data.
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Dependent Variable τ growth
(a) (b) (c) (d)
tt−1 -0.069 -0.069 -0.082 -0.078
(0.100) (0.100) (0.108) (0.110)
tt -0.161** -0.161** -0.164* -0.178**
(0.078) (0.078) (0.088) (0.089)
tt+1 0.217* 0.214* 0.215* 0.211*
(0.110) (0.109) (0.110) (0.109)
tt−1 · Ii,t 0.279
(0.273)
tt · Ii,t 0.095
(0.297)
tt+1 · Ii,t 0.240 0.173
(0.262) (0.279)
tt−1 · change− ideology 0.070
(0.098)
tt · change− ideology 0.011
(0.101)
tt+1 · change− ideology 0.089 0.100
(0.124) (0.126)
Notes: Dependent variable: annual percentage change in the statutory business tax rate. Municipality and
time fixed effects included in all models. Standard errors are clustered at the state-year level. *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Models (a) and (c) augment the set of regressors by an interaction between the electoral
cycle and a dummy variable indicating changes in the ideological composition of the local council, models
(b) and (d) with an index for the general composition of the local council (Iit, see definition in the text).
For results of control variables refer to Table 12 in the appendix.
Table 5: Changes in the composition of councils
Dependent Variable τ growth τ binary τ binary
(a) (b) (c)
tt−1 -0.032 -0.071 -0.567*
(0.079) (0.248) (0.298)
tt−1 -0.150** -0.514** -0.236
(0.067) (0.217) (0.226)
tt 0.124 0.543** 0.097
(0.090) (0.224) (0.258)
taxt−1 -0.102*** -0.028*** 0.013***
(0.010) (0.004) (0.002)
Notes: Dependent variable: annual percentage change in the statutory business tax rate in model (a) and
binary variables indicating tax hikes and tax cuts in models (b) and (c). Model (a) includes municipality
fixed effects, (b) and (c) state level fixed effects. Time fixed effects always included. Standard errors are
clustered at the state-year level, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 6: Inclusion of the lagged tax level
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Dependent Variable τ effective τ difference
(a) (b)
tt−1 -0.074 -0.212
(0.090) (0.359)
tt -0.153** -0.532*
(0.070) (0.269)
tt+1 0.193** 0.714**
(0.088) (0.352)
Notes: Dependent variable: annual percentage change in the effective business tax rate in model (a) and
first difference in the local business tax rate in model (b). Time and municipality fixed effects included in
all models. Standard errors are clustered at the state-year level. Dependent variable in (a) is the effective
tax rate, in (b) the first difference. For results of control variables refer to Table 13 in the appendix.
Table 7: Other definitions of the dependent variable
Dependent Variable τ growth
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
tt−2 0.047
(0.082)
tt−1 -0.073
(0.091)
tt -0.170**
(0.075)
tt+1 0.247***
(0.090)
tt+2 0.007
(0.126)
Notes: Dependent variable: annual percentage change in the statutory business tax rate. Time and munic-
ipality fixed effects included in all models. Standard errors are clustered at the state-year level.
Table 8: Separate inclusion of electoral year dummies
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A. Detailed Tables
Dependent Variable τ growth
(a) (b) (c)
credits 0.265*** 0.265** 0.265**
(0.093) (0.123) (0.109)
income p.c. 0.666 0.666 0.666
(0.561) (0.533) (1.423)
debt p.c. -0.033 -0.033 -0.033
(0.042) (0.035) (0.089)
expenditures -0.019* -0.019 -0.019
(0.011) (0.020) (0.031)
unemployment -2.285* -2.285 -2.285
(1.387) (1.434) (2.004)
population 0.238 0.238 0.238
(0.429) (0.164) (0.268)
young 0.519 0.519 0.519
(0.668) (1.278) (1.144)
old -0.801 -0.801 -0.801
(0.673) (1.178) (1.029)
spd 0.363** 0.363** 0.363
(0.184) (0.175) (0.273)
cdu 0.302** 0.302** 0.302
(0.152) (0.143) (0.327)
fdp -2.033** -2.033*** -2.033
(0.789) (0.678) (1.539)
gruene 0.373 0.373 0.373
(0.708) (0.925) (1.153)
Constant -6.183 -6.183 -6.183
(5.425) (5.150) (13.754)
Observations 69,083 69,083 69,083
R-squared 0.011 0.011 0.011
Groups 7,714 7,714 7,714
Notes: Results of control variables for the estimations presented in Table 3 in the text. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 10: Regression results control variables
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Dependent Variable τ growth τ growth τ binary τ binary
(a) (b) (c) (d)
tt−1 -0.082 0.008 -0.087 -0.551*
(0.098) (0.017) (0.256) (0.303)
tt−1 -0.157** -0.013 -0.521** -0.220
(0.075) (0.012) (0.220) (0.228)
tt+1 0.218** -0.012 0.532** 0.094
(0.096) (0.012) (0.228) (0.251)
credits 0.310*** -0.045 0.532*** -0.403
(0.084) (0.069) (0.156) (0.565)
income p.c. 1.265 -0.599 -0.450 1.678***
(1.378) (0.364) (0.516) (0.501)
debt p.c. -0.033 -0.001 0.040 -0.015
(0.081) (0.020) (0.089) (0.087)
expenditures 0.015 -0.034 0.007 0.033***
(0.013) (0.032) (0.010) (0.013)
unemployment -2.442 0.157 -0.210 -1.472
(1.916) (0.481) (3.682) (5.524)
population 0.459** -0.221 -0.266*** 0.074***
(0.213) (0.150) (0.071) (0.014)
young 0.076 0.443 0.708 -1.101
(0.719) (1.053) (0.525) (1.930)
old 0.475 -1.276 1.120*** -0.582
(0.626) (0.938) (0.399) (1.548)
city 0.062 0.072
(0.061) (0.138)
spd 0.346 0.017 0.129 0.344
(0.258) (0.067) (0.159) (0.335)
cdu 0.289 0.013 0.165 0.064
(0.322) (0.060) (0.103) (0.266)
fdp -2.514* 0.481 -0.497 3.179***
(1.482) (0.461) (0.583) (0.907)
gruene 0.552 -0.178 -0.990 3.447***
(1.035) (0.342) (0.650) (1.014)
Constant -12.169 5.986* 1.664 -21.149***
(13.293) (3.562) (4.924) (4.908)
Notes: Results of control variables for the estimations presented in Table 4 in the text. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 11: Regression results control variables
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Dependent Variable τ growth
(a) (b) (c) (d)
credits 0.261** 0.261** 0.262** 0.261**
(0.109) (0.109) (0.109) (0.109)
income p.c. 0.761 0.756 0.755 0.748
(1.469) (1.472) (1.468) (1.476)
debt p.c. -0.013 -0.013 -0.012 -0.013
(0.100) (0.100) (0.100) (0.100)
expenditures -0.019 -0.019 -0.019 -0.019
(0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032)
unemployment -2.093 -2.079 -2.079 -2.078
(2.002) (1.976) (1.998) (1.974)
population 0.171 0.167 0.176 0.164
(0.249) (0.249) (0.249) (0.248)
young 0.504 0.505 0.510 0.517
(1.145) (1.146) (1.144) (1.147)
old -0.811 -0.813 -0.809 -0.800
(1.027) (1.026) (1.026) (1.025)
spd 0.402 0.418 0.388 0.439
(0.282) (0.283) (0.279) (0.282)
cdu 0.337 0.345 0.340 0.353
(0.333) (0.335) (0.332) (0.339)
fdp -1.941 -1.938 -1.950 -1.947
(1.567) (1.568) (1.569) (1.561)
gruene 0.219 0.217 0.208 0.199
(1.186) (1.184) (1.184) (1.180)
Constant -7.060 -7.017 -7.002 -6.949
(14.196) (14.225) (14.179) (14.251)
Notes: Results of control variables for the estimations presented in Table 5 in the text. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 12: Regression results control variables
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Dependent Variable τ effective τ difference
(a) (b)
credits 0.272*** 0.993***
(0.097) (0.360)
income p.c. 0.660 2.467
(1.299) (4.912)
debt p.c. -0.027 -0.104
(0.079) (0.310)
expenditures -0.002 -0.030
(0.020) (0.084)
unemployment -2.132 -8.196
(1.799) (6.945)
population 0.237 1.005
(0.229) (1.042)
young 0.274 2.276
(0.847) (3.963)
old -0.434 -1.851
(0.764) (3.469)
spd 0.346 1.302
(0.249) (0.981)
cdu 0.269 1.283
(0.297) (1.257)
fdp -1.956 -7.679
(1.354) (5.863)
gruene 0.645 0.558
(1.125) (4.097)
Constant -6.135 -23.123
(12.540) (47.398)
Notes: Results for controls of the estimations presented in Table 7 in the text. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1
Table 13: Regression results control variables
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